Abstract-This paper defines and studies a special kind of equilibrium termed as "balancing equilibrium" which arises in the power allocation game in [14] . The equilibrium has both unique mathematical property and realistic implications. In the equilibrium, all countries in antagonism have to use all of their own power to counteract the received threats, and the threat made to each adversary only equalizes the threat received from that adversary. This paper establishes necessary and sufficient conditions for countries' power in order for this equilibrium to exist in different types of networked international environments. It also links the existence of this equilibrium in PAGs on structurally balanced graphs to the Hall's Maximum Matching problem and the Max Flow problem.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent paper [14] , a power allocation game (the PAG, hereafter) on networks is developed to study countries' strategic behaviors of resource allocation among one another in an international environment. In the game, countries allocate their resources, i.e., deploying their total power, to their friends and foes in order to protect the survival of their friends and themselves while opposing that of their foes. In [15] , the PAG is used to study countries' survival in networked international environments, and several sets of conditions for the environments where countries may survive are provided. [15] also contains a brief discussion of a special type of pure strategy Nash equilibrium. This paper investigates the existence of balancing equilibrium in the context of the power allocation game. The motivation for this paper comes from both the simple technical structure of the equilibrium of interest and its real world implications. When all the antagonistic countries in the environment makes up a bipartite graph, the condition for countries' power takes a similar form to that of the Hall's maximum matching theorem (see [5] - [7] , [18] ).
The paper belongs to a vast literature on agents' interactions on signed graphs. This literature finds its way back to the study of consensus in distributed, multi-agent systems, where the earliest work include [11] , [21] , [25] . It was further extended to scenarios where antagonistic interactions also exist; correspondingly, signed graphs are then adopted to guide the analysis (i.e., a signed graph is a graph where each edge has a positive sign denoting a cooperative relation or a negative sign denoting a conflictual relation), and some related works are [1] - [3] , [16] , [17] , [20] , [22] - [24] , [26] . A particular type of signed graph called a "structurally balanced graph" (see the definition of "structurally balanced" in [4] ) plays a key role in the "modulus consensus" problem (e.g., [2] , [26] ).
In contrast with the consensus problem on signed graphs, an optimization framework is necessarily needed for studying agents' strategic interactions on signed graphs. Moreover, a game-theoretic framework can naturally be formulated to capture the noncooperative and cooperative scenarios innate to those interactions. It appears that [12] , [14] , [15] and this paper are the first set of papers on the topic of games on signed graphs; a difference between the PAG in the latter three papers and [12] is the PAG's being a distributed, resource allocation game on signed graphs with a total resource constraint for each agent. It should also be noted that "games on signed graphs" means the class of games where agents' strategy does not involve changing their network of relations. Games where agents' strategy does involve changing the networks are usually referred to as network formation games (e.g., a survey can be found in [9] ; network formation games on countries' relation dynamics include [8] , [10] and [13] . Especially, [8] studies what kinds of networks in Nash equilibrium are structurally balanced).
The organization of this paper is as follows. First, the PAG is briefly reviewed to introduce the set of notations and concepts that will be used in the analysis. Second, balancing equilibrium will be defined and its real world implications will be discussed. Third, its existence will be investigated in PAGs assuming different networked environments. In particular, balancing equilibrium in PAGs on structurally balanced graphs will be studied in relation to the Hall Maximum Matching problem and the Max Flow problem in combinatorial optimization.
II. THE POWER ALLOCATION GAME
In the PAG proposed in [14] , there is a collection C of n countries, labeled 1, 2, . . . , n; let the set of country labels be n = {1, 2, . . . , n}. The total power of all n countries is defined as a real, nonnegative valued row vector p = [p i ] 1×n , where p i is country i's total power.
Any two countries in C can be said to have a relation. A relation is technically speaking a binary relation defined on C, which takes one of the following four possibilities: with itself, each country i can be said to have a self relation; with any other country j in C, each country i can have a friend, an adversary or a null relation. As assumed, the binary relation is reflexive, symmetric, and not transitive. Based on this binary relation, the friend set, the adversary set of country i, and the set of countries with whom country i have no relations are respectively denoted as F i , A i , and n − {i} ∪ F i ∪ A i in [14] .
The unordered pair {i, j} denotes a pair of distinct labels in n such that i and j have a relation. Denote the set of all friendly pairs as R f and the set of all adversarial pairs as R a . Suppose the number of pairs in R f ∪ R a is m. A map η : R f ∪ R a → m where m = {1, 2, ..., m} determines for each element in R f ∪ R a a distinct label in the set m.
Country i's power allocation strategy is a real, nonnegative valued row vector u i ∈ R 1×n whose j-th entry is u ij . If j ∈ F i , then u ij represents the portion of country i's total power which country i is willing to commit to the support or defense of friend j against friend j's adversaries. If j ∈ A i , then u ij is the portion of country i's total power that it is committing to its possible offense actions against country j. If j ∈ {i}, u ii is the portion of country i's total power it holds in reserve. Finally, if n − {i} ∪ A i ∪ F i , u ij represents the portion of country i's total power committing to j which i has no specific relation with, and we stipulate that u ij = 0. Accordingly, for each i ∈ n, n j=1 u ij = p i so the i-th row sum of the power allocation matrix U = [u ij ] n×n is p i . U denotes the set of all admissible power allocation matrices.
For each country i ∈ n, there are two types of nonnegative-valued functions on U. The first, called a support function for agent i, is the map
Here j∈Fi u ji is the total amount of power the friends of country i commit to country i's defense and j∈Ai u ij is the total amount of power country i commits to its possible offenses against all of its adversaries. The second function, called a threat function for country i, is the map
Thus τ i (U ) is the total power of all of country i's adversaries commit to their respective offenses against country i.
As a consequence of specific allocations, each country i may find itself in one of three possible states, namely a safe state, a precarious state, or an unsafe state. A country is said to survive if it is in the safe or precarious state. Let x i : U → {safe, precarious, unsafe} denote the map
is called the state of country i induced by power allocation matrix U ∈ U. More generally, by the state of the overall collection of countries C induced by power allocation matrix U is meant the row vector
The state space of C is thus the finite set X = {x(U ) : U ∈ U} whose cardinality is at most 3 n .
When it comes to expressing the preferences for one power allocation matrix V over another U (e.g., written as U V if country i weakly prefers V over U ), two axioms are proposed in [14] and [15] to model two assumptions about countries' preferences commonly accepted in international relations theory; that is, any country i cares positively about the survival of its friends and itself, negatively about the survival of its adversaries, and indifferently about the survival of those with whom it has no relations, while, amongst all, prioritizing its own survival.
The PAG in a networked international environment is thus the collection of all the aforementioned elements, Γ = {C, p, U, σ i , τ i , X , }. Denote the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria as U
* . An equivalence relation can be defined on
It has also been established in [14] that the PAG Γ = {C, p, U, σ i , τ i , X , } always has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Lastly, for illustrative purposes, [14] defines two separate graphs for a PAG, one being the "environment graph" of the PAG which is an edge-colored, undirected and unweighted graph on n vertices and m edges, G E = (V, E E ), and the other being the "allocation graph" of the PAG An edgecolored, directed and weighted graph on n vertices and 2m edges, G A = (V, E A ). Two countries i and j with a friend or adversary relation are connected by an undirected edge {v i , v j } in G E , and two directed edges
III. BALANCING EQUILIBRIUM

Example 2:
The networked environment in which the PAG takes place is characterized by the following parameters:
3) Countries' relations: A i = n \ {i}, i ∈ n 4) Countries' preferences: Assume the two axioms.
Other than the first three equilibrium classes, each of which has respectively country 1, 2 and 3 as the only survivor (see the discussion in [15] ), there is a fourth equilibrium class with all countries being precarious. The allocations between any two adversaries are symmetric, and no country is left with any remaining total power. This fourth equilibrium class motivates the below definition: 
A balancing equilibrium is obviously a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, which is proven as the follows:
, } is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof: In a BE U * , no country will have incentives to deviate.
Therefore, in any of the cases country i has no incentives to deviate because it has already attained the best power allocation outcome by the two axioms.
Thus, a BE U * is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
A balancing equilibrium's realistic implication lies in first illustrating a possible situation multiple parties in conflicts may arrive at. None has enough power preponderance over others to avoid the precarious state as predicted in the equilibrium. No one will deviate from this equilibrium unless there is a change to their power condition.
Second, it provides the theoretical basis for a particular kind of military strategy; the Chinese proverb for the military strategy is "yu bang xiang zheng, yu weng de li", and the English counterpart is "when shepherds quarrel, the wolf has a winning game". In other words, by the strategy, the third party can take advantage of others' internal conflicts and thereby achieve its own goals. For example, Catherine the great hoped to minimize the potential threats to her empire from Austria and Prussia by entangling these two countries in conflicts with France -as she told her secretary in November 1791, "I am racking my brains in order to push the courts of Vienna and Berlin into French affairs...there are reasons i cannot talk about; I want to get them involved in that business to have my hands free. I have much unfinished business, and it's necessary for them to be kept busy and out of my way". [19] It should also be noted that the unique survivor respectively in Figure ( Proof: This is obvious by definition.
Example 1:
In R A , the three adversary pairs {1, 2}, {2, 3} and {1, 3} are labelled from 1 to 3. The BE in Figure  1 
To understand why, finding the BE in Example 1 is equivalent to minimizing (z A ) 1 + (z A ) 2 + (z A ) 3 over the constraints:
Based on the specific technical structure of balancing equilibrium, the following "construction lemma" is presented. Applying it repeatedly, one can start from a simple game that has a BE, and construct a far more complex game while retaining the existence of BE.
Lemma 1: (Constructing
, } is a power allocation game with a BE. Take any i, j ∈ V such that r i,j , and let p ′ = p + δ(e i + e j ), where δ is a positive real number. Then the new game
, } also has a BE.
Proof: Suppose U is a BE of game Γ. Take {i, j} ∈ R A , and let U ′ = U + δ(e i e ⊤ j + e j e ⊤ i ). U ′ is a valid strategy matrix of game Γ ′ .
Obviously, U ′ is symmetric. ∀i s.t. A i = ∅, w ′ ii = 0. No one will deviate, and therefore, it is a BE of game Γ ′ .
Lemma 1 implies that Γ and Γ ′ are only different by the power of two countries i and j involved in the relation r i,j . Lemma 2 constructs another new node (and its relation) for the original game and a new BE for the new game.
Lemma 2: (Constructing nodes and allocations) Γ = {C, p, U, σ i , τ i , X , } is a power allocation game with a BE. Take some v n+1 / ∈ V. Let p n+1 = 0, {i, n + 1} ∈ R A for one country i ∈ V. Then the game after incorporating v n+1 ,
Proof: Suppose U is a BE of game Γ. Then U ′ = U 0 0 0 is the BE of game Γ ′ . The above figure illustrates the process of applying Lemma 2 to construct a BE for a four-player game: 1) Add a country with zero power, country 4, to the original game. 2) Add 2 to both p 3 and p 4 and obtain the new game.
3) Construct the BEs before and after the change.
A necessary power condition for countries is now stated for the existence of BE in environments of any relation configuration. The intuition is that if there exists a country whose power does not satisfy the below condition, this country will never exhaust its power by allocating to its adversaries. Theorem 4 (whose proof requires Lemma 3) shows that this is actually the necessary and sufficient condition for countries' power for a BE to exist in a PAG where the adversary pairs make up a complete graph.
Theorem 3: (Necessary power condition)
In a game Γ = {C, p, U, σ i , τ i , X , }, the necessary condition for the existence of a BE is that ∀i ∈ V, j∈Ai p j ≥ p i .
Proof: By the definition of BE, ∀i s.t., u ii = 0 and u ji = u ij . And by the power constraint, u ji ≤ p j .
Therefore, it is shown that
Lemma 3: (Unique BE with Three-Player Complete adversary Graph) In a game Γ = {C, p, U, σ i , τ i , X , }, there are three countries with adversary relations. If the adversary relations make up a complete graph and if the total power condition in theorem 3 holds for them, a unique BE exists for Γ.
Proof: A unique BE, an allocation matrix U , can be constructed. For the three countries country 1, country 2 and country 3 making up a complete graph, their mutual allocations and self-allocations are
The three invests 0 on the other countries. Those without a adversary relation invest all their total capacities as their self-defense. Such a U is a BE, which is also unique.
Theorem 4: (BE in Games with Complete adversary Graph)
In a power allocation game Γ = {C, p, U, σ i , τ i , X , } where the adversary pairs make up a complete subgraph of G E , the game has a BE if and only if the necessary total power condition in Theorem 3 holds for these countries.
Proof:
The proof is by induction.
The Base Case: As proven in Lemma 3, a game where the adversary relations make up a complete 3-country graph has a BE if the total power condition holds for them.
The Induction Hypothesis: a game where the adversary relations make up a complete k-country graph has a BE if the total power condition holds for them (k ∈ Z and k > 3).
The Induction
Step: Prove that the theorem holds with k + 1 countries using the assumption above.
Sort the capacities of the k+1 countries by a nonincreasing order: p 1 ≥ p 2 ... ≥ p k+1 . By the above assumption, the total power condition holds.
Subtract p 1 by p k+1 and p k+1 by p k+1 . Resort the capacities by a decreasing order 1 :
The total power condition holds for each of the k + 1 country. Before the change,
The total power condition still holds for p 1 .
Since p 2 ≤ p 1 and p k+1 ≤ p k , it can be proven that p 2 ≤ (p 1 − p k+1 )+ p 3 + ...+ p k . Then for p 2 , the total power condition still holds. Similarly, the total power condition holds for the rest of the countries.
By the induction hypothesis, a BE U exists for the game, which has the above k countries with capacities p 
Now another BE, U
′ is obtained with the following steps.
• Insert a new row after the k-th row and a new column after the k-th column in U , which was originally a (n− 1) × (n − 1) matrix after deleting the (k + 1)-th country, to restore it as a n × n matrix and to represent the allocations by and towards country k + 1.
• Initialize the elements in the new row and new column as 0.
• Then add back the subtracted power p k+1 by updating u 1,k+1 and u k+1,1 as p k+1 .
By the construction lemma, U ′ is a BE. Hence, any game where the adversary relations make up a complete graph has a BE if and only if the total power condition holds.
The below figure illustrates the induction step with a 1 Note that p ′ 1 is not necessarily p 1 − p k+1 .
simple case -at the end of the process, a BE for the original game is constructed.
discusses an alternative set of countries' power condition for BE to exist in environments where the adversary pairs make up a bipartite graph, termed as extended power condition. This kinds of graphs can also be called structurally balanced graphs [4] . Moreover, this extended power condition takes a similar form with the neighbor set condition in the Hall Maximum Matching theorem in Theorem 5. Theorem 7 discusses BE in this kind of environments in relation to the Max Flow problem. [7] ) Let G = (V, E) be a finite bipartite graph where V = L∪R with L ∩ R = ∅. G has a maximum matching if and only if that for all subsets S ∈ L, we have |γ(S)| ≥ S| (γ(S) = {j ∈ R|(i, j) ∈ E for some i ∈ L}), and vice versa.
Theorem 5: (Hall's Maximum Matching Theorem
Theorem 6: (BE in Games on Structurally Balanced
Graph) The games on structurally balanced graphs, in other words, the environments where the adversary pairs make up a bipartite graph, have a BE if and only if the extended power condition holds for the countries with adversaries:
By definition, the two sets of nodes, L and R, represent the two groups of countries with adversaries relations, where each country in either set is only connected to countries in the other set. S is a subset of either set.
By the property of connected graph, alternating paths exist between i and j, whose lengths should be odd. Since this is a directed graph with symmetric edges, the length of the path is given by the number of antagonistic pairs on it. Below will be shown that there is at least an augmenting path P between i and j such that the positive z 1 can be further minimized. This would contradict the fact that when the extended power condition holds, z i 1 is positive. Then a BE must exist. Suppose on all alternating paths between i ∈ L and j ∈ R with z i > 0 and z j > 0, there must be an even edge in the path with zero allocations. Then a case that contradicts the above statement is derived below:
This step generates the first odd edge of the paths and its symmetric edge.
This step gives the first even edge of the paths and its symmetric edge, on which the symmetric allocations are positive. 4) Repeat step 2 and 3 until L ′ and R ′ stay fixed.
At the end of the above process, a subgraph
′ , all the alternating paths starting at i have positive allocations on the even edges. It has been supposed that for all alternating paths between two nodes with positive node allocations there must be an even edge in them with zero allocations. G ′ does not have any alternating path starting with i with zero allocations on even edges. Also, by the property of connected graph, any path that starts at i can end at any node in R ′ . Then it must be that all nodes in R ′ have zero node allocations.
Then the extended power condition does not hold for G ′ . Contradiction. The contrapositive is that if the extended power condition holds, there exists an alternating path between i ∈ L and j ∈ R with i > 0 and j > 0 that does not have an even edge with zero allocations. Then this path must have positive allocations on all even edges. However, this path is an augmenting one. The augmenting process is as follows: 1) Pick a δ such that δ < min{z i , z j } and δ is smaller than the symmetric allocations on the first even edge and its symmetric edge. 2) Reduce z i by δ, add the allocations on the first odd edge and its symmetric edge with δ, and reduce the allocations on the first even edge and its symmetric edge with δ. 3) Repeat by adding δ for allocations on all odd edges and their symmetric edges, and reducing δ for allocations on all even edges and their symmetric edges until reaching j. At the end of the process, since the length of the path is odd, z j is also reduced by δ. Then z 1 is further minimized. Thus, when the extended power condition holds, there exists an augmenting path between i ∈ L and j ∈ R with z i > 0 and z j > 0. Then under the total power condition, there exists a symmetric U for the bipartite graph in which z 1 = 0. Then a BE must exist for the whole game. does not hold, it means that there is a set of countries S whose total power exceeds that of their adversaries.
There will not be a BE as countries in S will not exhaust their power by allocating to their adversaries.
Theorem 7:
(Equivalence between BE on Bipartite adversary Graph and Max Flow) For a power allocation game Γ = {C, p, U, σ i , τ i , X , } with a bipartite adversary graph G E = (V, E E ) of L and R, construct a flow network G ′ E = (V ′ , E ′ E ).
• V ′ = V ∪ {s, t}, with s being the source and t being the sink.
• E ′ E = {(s, i)|i ∈ L} ∪{(i, j)|i ∈ L, j ∈ R} ∪{(j, t)|j ∈ R}.
• Edge capacities 2 in G ′ are: c ′ (s, i) = p i if i ∈ L; c ′ (j, t) = p j if j ∈ R; c ′ (i, j) = +∞ if i ∈ L and j ∈ R.
The problem of finding a BE in the original game is equivalent to finding a max flow (min cut) f ′ in G ′ , which satisfies that f ′ (s, i) = c ′ (s, i) if i ∈ L and f ′ (j, t) = c ′ (j, t) if j ∈ R 3 .
Proof: As proved in Theorem 2, finding a BE is equivalent to finding a decomposition p A = B A d A .
If such a decomposition is found, let f 
IV. CONCLUSIONS
An obvious and important extension of this paper is to the case where the antagonism in the networked international environment makes up a k-partite graph. Realistically, this can be regarded as a k-sided game where countries could be friends with those from the same side and only be adversaries with those from the other k − 1 sides. Moreover, the k-sided game is actually a generalization of a commonly known kplayer game, which can expect to encompass a series of scenarios in countries' conflicts and cooperation of the real world. A natural question to ask is that, in this kind of environment, what kind of power condition for countries is it in order to balancing equilibrium to exist?
